The Russia-Ukraine war is undoubtedly the largest and most dangerous geopolitical crisis that Europe has faced since the end of the Cold War in 1989. But it is just the latest manifestation of an angry Russia wanting to reassert itself in its neighbourhood and ultimately in the world. In 1989 some talked of “the end of history” so profound was the change at that particular point. The historian Timothy Garton Ash recently divided the late 20th century into several distinct periods.
The 1945-1989 period is the Cold War that we are almost all familiar with. The November 1989 (fall of the Berlin Wall) – February 2022 (invasion of Ukraine) period he called the “Post Wall” period, albeit one where some important moves to shore up Europe took place. These included the creation of the Euro, an expanded NATO, EU enlargement and the eastern half of Europe, with some exceptions did become free and democratic. But from February 2022 we faced a full-scale war in Europe. Sitting in Europe it can sometimes feel a very long way away as it has been more than 75 years since the end of the Second World War. On the front lines in Ukraine you cannot forget it, and even near neighbours like Poland and the Baltic States have not forgotten their own time under Soviet occupation. The collapse of the Soviet Union is ancient history to some, to those of us there at the time it feels like yesterday so all-encompassing was the Soviet state. That state may have disappeared in 1989 but in 2022 it reemerged as an updated version of 1989, with better communication skills and computer graphics.
Today several newspapers are running articles about the early moves towards conscription – “voluntary for now” – in France and Germany. We have moved from hope and optimism in 1989 to concern and fear in 2025. The invasion and seizure of Ukrainian territory highlighted the arrival of a new order in Europe. Has Europe responded well to the emergence of both a new order and a strategic competitor right on Europe’s doorstep?
History may be a tough judge of our performance but I am not convinced that Europe has responded as well as it could have to the challenge posed by a revanchist Russia. Europe still buys considerable quantities of oil and gas from Russia, which fuels Russia’s war and maintains the Russian state even though oil prices are fairly depressed at present as a result of increasing supplies. We might suggest that Europe puts its house in order and buys less gas from supergiant fields like Yamal and less oil from Russia’s Siberian fields. Sanctions on Russian oil and gas could have a significant impact on Moscow’s hard currency earnings and its ability to wage war in Ukraine.
That said, Europe is no longer the only game in town for a sanctioned country looking to secure a stream of export earnings from energy. China and India – countries with their own interests to protect and the ability to withstand pressure from the US – are major buyers of Russian energy. While there have been some indications that India has been buying less (Reliance has reportedly stopped buying Russian crude completely because of sanctions), it could also be sleight of hand with the use of Russia’s ghost fleet and deliberately non-functioning transponders to hide shipping movements from the prying lenses of passing satellites while cross-border pipelines likely ship large volumes day and night between Russia and China. The coal industry is suffering, however, with sanctions, increasing costs and low prices creating a difficult situation for the sector. It is mainly a domestic sector but it also shows that the Russian war economy is not able to operate at full capacity.
China, on the other hand, appears to be doing well by raising prices for war supplies to Russia. With western military supplies unavailable, prices of weaponry have risen 87% between 2021 and 2024 against 9% for other theatres. While in a perfect world China would not be supplying Russia with weapons, the higher prices alone will have curtailed Russia’s ability to buy as many war supplies as they may want.
Closer to home Europe seems completely incapable of taking what seems a simple decision: to seize the interest on the frozen Russian assets at Euroclear in Belgium and use it either directly or as a guarantee for loans to buy weapons from the United States on behalf of Ukraine. Every time an opportunity emerges to go down that road, Europe takes a different path. China and the US are undoubted superpowers, they can take and implement decisions with remarkable speed if the situation is urgent enough. Europe? “Call back tomorrow, we’re in a meeting”. Think of it as the small boats of global finance, everyone knows what to do but nobody wants to take responsibility for making a decision of such magnitude. Not today, anyway. Asset freezes may be an alternative answer to the challenge if outright seizure of Russian state assets is too difficult to contemplate. That would encourage Russia to comply with Europe’s sanctions requirements with the promise of relief once that had been secured.
There is a nettle around the topic of a whole-of-Europe approach to sanctions on Russia that is waiting to be grasped. The key question is whether Europe can bring itself to do so given the potential for escalation.
